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ENVIRONMENTAL UPDATES
Mark Whitfield v. Triad Transp., Inc., 2008 WL 139082 (E.D. Ark. 2008)
The case of Mark Whitfleld v. Triad Transport, Inc. stems from a
fire incident accompanied by a sequence of explosions that occurred at the
defendants' hazard waste facility in Saline County, Arkansas. The
plaintiffs, who were residents of Saline County and were either forced to
evacuate or were physically harmed by the events, filed an action in circuit
court, asserting a series of complaints based on trespass, nuisance,
absolute liability, and negligence. Among the plaintiffs' complaint are
allegations of failing to properly package and label the chemicals that
were shipped to the facility, as well as failing to prevent the chemicals
from exploding or igniting on the site, failing to properly design the waste
facility, and failing to abate the plaintiffs' property.
The defendants subsequently sought to remove the action to
federal court, claiming that the plaintiffs' complaint turns on an issue of
federal law and the only way to grant the plaintiffs' injunction was to
employ the federal rules and regulations. Because the defendants, as the
moving party, carry the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction, they
must prove that the plaintiffs' cause of action arises under federal law. In
response, the plaintiffs moved to remand, which was ultimately granted by
the Arkansas Eastern District Court.
The defendants claim that the federal court has original jurisdiction
because the plaintiffs' contentions are required to be consistent with the
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act ("HMTA") provisions.
Additionally, the defendants further contend that the complaints are
controlled by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and because
the plaintiffs are seeking an injunctive remedy, the court will be required
to fashion a remedy under those federal regulations. However, the court
ruled that federal question jurisdiction is not created by a federal defense,
including the preempted defense, even if that is the sole contested issue in
the case. As a result, the court found the complete preemption doctrine to
be applicable. Under the doctrine, once a state law has been preempted,
any claim based on the preempted state law is thus considered a federal
claim and arises under federal law. Therefore, the court must decide if
Congress manifested an intent for a state law cause of action to be
removed to federal court, keeping in mind that an ordinary federal case,
preemption is only a defense to the plaintiffs' complaint.
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The court held that because the HMTA has a preemption clause
that has never been held to completely preempt state common law claims
in the last thirty years, the defendants failed to show that the plaintiffs'
allegations are preempted by the federal law. Because the HMTA
regulates the transport of hazardous material, and not the end use of the
hazardous substance, there is no overlap between the HMTA and the
plaintiffs' contentions. Allowing the HMTA to preclude the plaintiffs'
cause of action would therefore be unreasonable and against the intention
of Congress. As a result, the defendants' motion to remove the case to





U.S. v. Vasquez-Ramos, 522 F.3d 914 (9h Cir. 2008) (Opinion
withdrawn and superseded on rehearing by 531 F.3d 987)
On April 10, 2008, the Ninth Circuit held that prosecution for the
possession of feathers and talons of bald and golden eagles without a
permit did not violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA").
In 2002, law enforcement officers were investigating the killing of bald
eagles in captivity at the Santa Barbara Zoo when they found parts and
feathers of eagles and other migratory birds in the residences of Mario
Manuel Vasquez-Ramos and Luis Rodriguez-Martinez. They were
charged with violating the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act
("BGEPA") and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA"). Defendants
were not members of federally-recognized Indian tribes and did not have a
permit for possession of the bird parts. Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss, claiming that their prosecution impermissibly burdened their
religious practice under the RFRA.
The BGEPA makes it illegal to possess bald or golden eagles or
eagle parts without a permit. Only members of federally-recognized
Indian tribes may apply for permits and permit-eligible tribe members may
receive eagles and eagle parts only through the National Eagle Repository
in Colorado. The time it takes for a request to be filled ranges from ninety
days for bird parts to three and a half years for a whole bird. The demand
far exceeds supply, giving rise to a black market for eagles and eagle
parts.
The MBTA makes it illegal to possess any migratory birds,
including bald and golden eagles. While there is no specific exemption
for Native American religious use, the United States has adopted a policy
under which members of federally-recognized Indian tribes may possess
migratory bird parts. Non-members are not protected from prosecution.
Under the RFRA, the government cannot substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion unless it demonstrates that the burden to the
person is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the
least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The government
conceded that the Defendants' religious beliefs are substantially burdened
by the BGEPA and the MBTA. However, in previous cases, the Ninth
Circuit found that the government has a compelling interest in eagle
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protection that justifies limiting supply to eagles that pass through the
repository even though religious demand far exceeds supply. The court
stated that it was bound by precedent unless circumstances changed
significantly.
In 2007, the Department of Interior removed the bald eagle from
the Endangered Species List. The Defendants argued that there has been
sufficient recovery of eagle populations such that the government's
interest in eagle protection is no longer compelling. However, the court
stated that the bald eagle is not a mere bird but a symbol of American
ideals and freedom and it remains a symbol regardless of the number of
eagles in existence. The court also recognized that the Department of
Interior, when removing the bald eagle from the Endangered Species List,
repeatedly emphasized the importance of continued protection of the bald
eagle afforded by the BGEPA and the MBTA.
The Defendants argued that the government could remedy the
supply problem by increased diligence in salvage and recovery of eagle
carcasses. However, the court stated that even if that were true, the RFRA
does not require the government to make the practice of religion easier by
increasing the supply of available carcasses. Thus, the court held that the
prosecution of Native Americans who were not members of federally
recognized tribes for possessing feathers and talons of bald and golden





Florida Key Deer v. Paulison, 522 F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 2008)
The National Wildlife Federation and other wildlife conservation
organizations ("Wildlife Organizations") brought suit to enforce § 7(a)(2)
of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") against Federal Emergency
Management Agency ("FEMA") and the Fish and Wildlife Service
("FWS"). The organizations claimed FEMA jeopardized the existence of
Florida Key deer and other endangered and threatened species in its
administration of the National Flood Insurance Program ("NFIP")
authorized by the National Flood Insurance Act. Specifically, the Wildlife
Organizations alleged that FEMA's operation of the NFIP threatened the
Key deer and other species by promoting new land development in areas
deemed critical habitats for the species and developments that threatened
the species' existence. The organizations claimed § 7(a)(2) of the ESA
required FEMA to consult the FWS on the flood insurance program's
impact on the Key deer; FEMA disagreed, stating that ESA was not
applicable to the NFIP. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Florida agreed with the Wildlife Organizations, issued a Memorandum
Opinion and Final Declaratory Judgment mandating FEMA consult with
the FWS, and maintained jurisdiction to ensure FEMA's compliance with
the court's injunction.
FEMA subsequently consulted with the FWS, which found that
FEMA's administration of the NFIP in the Florida Keys indeed
jeopardized the Key deer and other species; in 1997, the FWS issued
"reasonable and prudent alternatives" ("RPA") to FEMA, and indicated
FWS would review new developments within the critical habitats.
Monroe County based its approvals of building pernmits on FWS's review
of the building projects, and under the RPAs, FEMA was to monitor
Monroe County's compliance, and alert the County of any violations. The
RPAs also included FWS's "conservation recommendations" for FEMA
under §7(a)(1) of the ESA, particularly that FEMA grant reduced
insurance premiums to those counties achieving a county-wide habitat
conservation plan. In an amended complaint from the original action, the
Wildlife Organizations contested the sufficiency of FWS's RPAs and
conservation recommendations under the ESA and Administrative
Procedure Act, and added FWS as a defendant. FEMA consulted with the
FWS again, as required by the RPAs in response to Monroe County's
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failure to enact a habitat conservation plan. In its 2003 opinion on the
effect of FEMA's administration of the NFIP on the endangered Florida
Keys species, FWS urged FEMA to continue executing the 1997 RPAs
and conservation recommendations. The Wildlife Organizations amended
their complaint, challenging FWS's 2003 RPAs and conservation
recommendations and moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the organizations' summary judgment,
stating that FEMA failed to meet its § 7(a)(1) species conservation
obligations in the administering of the NFIP program, and that both
FEMA and FWS failed to comply with the requirements of § 7(a)(2). The
district court issued an injunction, prohibiting FEMA from insuring any
new developments in critical habitats within Monroe County until further
consultations. FEMA and FWS appealed to the 1Ith Circuit Court of
Appeals, claiming § 7(a)(2) of the ESA is not applicable to FEMA's NFIP
and did not require FEMA to analyze FWS's RPAs prior to implementing
them. FEMA and FWS also argued that § 7(a)(1) did not require species-
and location-specific conservation programs, and that the district court's
injunction did not comply with the ESA and NFIA.
The 1Ith Circuit Court found that § 7(a)(2) applied to FEMA's
NFIP because all actions involving Federal discretionary control are
subject to § 7(a)(2). Since FEMA had discretion in its NFIP
administration and its community rating system program for providing
flood insurance premium discounts, FEMA had the discretion to consider
protecting the endangered species in the implementation of its programs as
required under §7(a)(2). In addition, the court observed that FEMA's
operation of NFIP was a "legally relevant cause" of the new development
threatening the species' existence. The court also concluded that FEMA
was not required to independently evaluate FWS's RPAs before
implementing them; however, the court cautioned that FEMA's decision
to take up FWS's RPAs would likely be challenged if new information
became available that neither FWS considered in its RPAs nor FEMA
considered in its decision, when the agencies were required to consider
that information.
Additionally, the court found that although it did not need
to address whether § 7(a)(1) required species-and location-specific
conservation programs, FEMA failed to comply with this section of ESA
because FEMA's conservation program lacked "action." Because FEMA
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failed to provide evidence showing that communities had implemented
conservation plans in response to FEMA's program incentives, the court
deemed FEMA's program as having "no effect" on conservation and an
"insignificant measure" in protecting the endangered species. Finally, the
court agreed with the district court's injunction, stating that the district
court could enjoin FEMA from further action until FEMA met ESA's
requirements. The court also clarified that the injunction was not
"inconsistent" with ESA and NFIA because the injunction precluded
FEMA from providing flood insurance to developments in the critical
habitats for the endangered species - it did not require that FEMA keep
providing flood insurance in Monroe County. As a result, the 11th Circuit
court affirmed the district court's judgment.
SHEILA NEEDLES
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Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917 (9th
Cir. 2008).
Each year, hundreds of thousands of endangered fall juvenile
Chinook salmon and steelhead struggle up the Columbia River and its
tributaries to hatch their young in fresh water, paddle downstream to
achieve adulthood, and then culminate their pilgrimage by returning
upstream to spawn. During the perilous voyage to the Pacific Ocean, the
fish must navigate no less than 14 sets of dams. As the endangered fish
engage each dam reservoir, they must combat other lurking predatory fish.
Even after surmounting such threats as the Northern Pikeminnow, the
salmonid and steelhead must either pass through the dam turbines or spill
over the dam. While dam spill-over is the safest method, the dam spill-
over requires careful maintenance to avoid gas supersaturation, which can
give the fish "gas bubble trauma," similar to the "bends" experienced by
human divers who surface too quickly. Sadly, up to 92 per cent of the
salmon and steelhead never realize this harrowing trek, and their current
numbers dwindle against the backdrop of their historic abundance.
Complementing the life phases of the anadromous salmonid and steelhead
is annual litigation in the Northwestern federal courts over the operation of
the Federal Columbia River Power System ("FRCPS") and its dams'
impacts on those brave fish.
At issue in the instant litigation is Section 7 of the Endangered
Species Act ("ESA"). It requires federal agencies to insure that their
actions are not likely to jeopardize listed species or destroy the species'
critical habitat. Plaintiffs, environmental advocacy groups, brought this
action, claiming the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS" (now
known as NOAA Fisheries")) violated provisions of the ESA by
conducting an inadequate analysis of proposed dam action on the
endangered fish. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the
NMFS conducted a subpar analysis because [1] NMFS's use of
hypothetical "reference operation" in their jeopardy analysis violated the
ESA in that it excluded dam impacts deemed "non-discretionary;" [2] the
Biological Opinion ("BiOp") failed to incorporate degraded baseline
conditions; [3] the BiOp failed to adequately consider agency action on
the fish's chances of recovery; and [4] the NMFS was acting arbitrarily
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and capriciously because its dam analysis failed to consider dam impacts
on the recovery value of critical habitat.
The court found that NMFS had purposefully used the obtuse
hypothetical "reference operation" standard so that NMFS would not have
to precisely determine the extent of discretionary agency action. An
agency cannot avoid considering real risks to an endangered species
simply by labeling the action "non-discretionary." The court reminded
NMFS of the United States Supreme Court precedent, TVA v. Hill, which
obligates federal agencies to afford priority to the declared national policy
of saving endangered species.
NMFS also failed to incorporate degraded baseline conditions, and
instead compared the impacts of proposed agency dam operations with its
hypothetical reference operation. The court reasoned that NMFS could
not properly consider its jeopardy analysis in a vacuum. Allowing NMFS
to use the hypothetical reference operation standard would just result in a
slow and incremental destruction of endangered species. This path, the
court found, is at odds with the essential purpose of the ESA.
In not considering proposed dam impacts on endangered species'
chance of recovery, the NMFS violated the ESA's mandate to consider
dam impacts which are "likely to jeopardize" an endangered species. The
NMFS's reasoning was that the ESA simply requires it to bar action that
would reduce appreciably the likelihood of survival. However, if an
agency only has to consider survival, there can never be jeopardy, even if
recovery is impossible. This is because a species can cling to survival
even when recovery is unlikely. Therefore, the court gave no deference to
NMFS's interpretation.
The court characterized NMFS' BiOp as "little more than an
analytical slight of hand, manipulating variables to achieve a 'no jeopardy'
finding." For example, under NMFS's statistical analysis, dead fish were
suddenly alive again. Because the ESA requires an approach to the dam
operations that is "a more realistic, common sense examination," the court
said the district court had properly rejected NMFS's BiOp.
JOSEPH R. SCHLOTZHAUER
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Animal Prot. Inst. and Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Holsten, 541
F.Supp.2d 1073 (D.Minn. 2008)
The Animal Protection Institute ("Institute") and the Center for
Biological Diversity ("Center"), collectively called "Plaintiffs," filed a suit
alleging that Mark Holsten, as Commissioner of the Minnesota
Department of Natural Resources ("DNR"), was previously, and is
currently, violating section 9 of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA").
Section 9 prohibits any takings of species listed under the ESA. The
Institute and Center claim that the ESA is being violated because Holsten
is allowing snaring and trapping of the Canada Lynx, a species currently
considered threatened under the ESA. The Plaintiffs allege that the snaring
and trapping activities constitute a "taking" of the Canada Lynx in
violation of the ESA.
The facts indicate that there are at least 13 reported incidents of
Canada Lynx being trapped or snared. The Plaintiffs argue that because
the DNR authorizes licensing and regulation of trapping in Minnesota it is
liable for the taking of the snared and trapped lynx. However, the
Minnesota Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") issued a 2003 pamphlet
instructing people on how to avoid incidental takings of lynx when
attempting to hunt Bobcats, and, in 2006, the FWS formally designated
critical habitat for the lynx. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment for
DNR's liability and an injunction that would require the DNR to take all
action needed to make sure that no more Canada Lynx were taken in
Minnesota through trapping or snaring activities.
In response, DNR moved for summary judgment as to the liability
and the requested injunction. First, DNR argued that since it would take a
year to issue the injunction the issue requests for relief are moot and the
Plaintiffs should reserve their right to seek relief when the permit is
issued. Second, DNR argued it was not liable under the ESA for any
incidental takings of the lynx because it only approves trapping and
snaring with a proper license. The argument was based on DNR's
understanding that the United States Supreme Court has held the ESA
"take" prohibition and "harm" regulations to include proximate cause and
foreseeability requirements. Therefore, the actions of the trappers are
independent, intervening causes relieving DNR of liability. Third, DNR
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argued that Plaintiffs proffered no evidence that a lynx taking occurred
when trappers followed appropriate state regulations.
The court rejected DNR's arguments primarily because of its
misinterpretation of case precedent. In the court's opinion the cited
precedent lent more support to the Plaintiffs position because the broader
purposes of the ESA extends protection against any activities that cause
the harms that Congress enacted the statute to avoid. Eighth Circuit
precedent also established that government agencies are liable for takings
if any activities that agency authorizes result in a taking. The court
rejected the second argument because DNR had not issued any regulations
to avoid lynx takings, but had developed recommendations, which the
trapper may disregard.
As to the Plaintiffs request for an injunction the DNR argues that
prospective injunctive relief is not warranted because no incidental takings
were reported after the winter of 2005. Another argument DNR proffers is
that the Tenth Amendment bars the injunction because nothing in the ESA
says that Congress meant to place a duty on any state to take specific
measures to ensure no incidental takings of a listed species occurred.
Based on the fact that 13 takings were reported since 2002, in
combination with the lack of regulatory response on DNR's part, the court
determined that additional takings were probable without further
implementation of appropriate regulations. Also, DNR's Tenth
Amendment argument fails because in this case, DNR is not being asked
to take steps toward advancing the goals of the ESA, but, rather, is being
ordered to come into compliance with the ESA.
Relying on the above arguments the court found DNR liable for
violating section 9 of the ESA by authorizing trapping and snaring in the
Canada Lynx's habitat, that the Tenth Amendment did not bar the
injunctive relief, and that injunctive relief was not moot. Therefore, the
court granted the injunctive relief and ordered DNR to take all action
necessary to make sure that no further takings of the Canada Lynx
occurred, including applying for an incidental take permit before April 30,
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Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., et al v. NRC, et al, 509 F.3d 562 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
In 2003, Louisiana Energy Services L.P. ("LES") filed an
application with the National Regulatory Commission ("NRC") for a new
enriched uranium facility near Eunice, New Mexico. Two organizations,
the Nuclear Information and Resource Service, and Public Citizen jointly
filed a petition before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, who denied
the groups' claims, upholding the licensing. An appeal was filed by the
two groups in the District of Columbia Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals in an
effort to intervene in the licensing proceedings.
The environmental groups argued the NRC's environmental
impact statement did not satisfactorily address the impact of the proposed
nuclear facility. More specifically, they asserted the NRC violated the
Atomic Energy Act by "supplementing" the impact statement during the
hearing process and by not challenging LES's disposal strategy and cost
estimates. Further, they asserted the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA") failed to adequately address the environmental consequences of
disposing of the facility's uranium waste.
In finding for LES, Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh wrote for the three-judge panel. The Court rejected the group's claims that the impact
statement was supplemented by establishing a simple timeline that
illustrated an environmental impact statement had been completed by the
time of the hearing process. The panel also rejected the groups' claim that
the NRC's review was deficient. They held the agency met its obligation
to take a 'hard look' at the environmental consequences of approving the
license. Finally, the court found there was no evidence that the NRC's
estimate on the nuclear project was unreasonable. They held that as a
reviewing court, they were not authorized to micromanage the agency's





OSL Inc. v. United States. 525 F.3d 1294 (11t1h Cir. 2008)
During the 1960s and 70s, the Air Force leased land from OSI,
Inc., called LF4, to use as a landfill. The Air Force also leased a larger
tract of land adjacent to LF4, called Maxwell AFB (the two tracts of land
were referred to as the OU- 1 area), which was also used as a landfill in the
1990's. Many materials, including hazardous waste, were dumped on
these sites. In 1990, the Air Force alerted OSI of possible soil and
groundwater contamination on LF4 and investigated the possible risk
contamination would pose to human health or the environment.
OSI sued the government for tort claims related to the Air Force's
dumping activities on LF4, sought cost recovery under CERCLA, and
filed a citizen suit under RCRA. The district court dismissed all claims
and the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the tort claim, but
vacated and remanded the grant of summary judgment on the RCRA and
CERCLA claims so that the district court could add to the record and
provide more explanation for its decision. On remand, the district court
granted summary judgment for the government on the CERCLA and
RCRA claims. OSI appealed.
OSI claimed that the district court erred and it had sufficient
evidence to show imminent and substantial harm and should have won on
summary judgment for the RCRA claim. The government argued that the
district court's decision should be affirmed because the court lacked
jurisdiction to hear the claim. The government claimed that there was an
ongoing CERCLA remedial action being conducted, and that CERCLA
bars challenges to cleanup that is ongoing. The court of appeals agreed
with the government on this claim.
The second argument on appeal was the interpretation of specific
CERCLA provisions concerning citizen suits and the source of authority
for CERCLA cleanups on federal land. RCRA allows an individual to
bring a civil action against anyone who has contributed to the disposal of
hazardous waste which poses an imminent and substantial risk to health
and the environment. CERCLA, however, allows for remedial actions
such as the one selected by the Air Force. CERCLA also bars federal
courts from reviewing challenges to removal or remedial actions under the
statute. The court found that if the Air Force's remedial action is classified
as one under the statute then the district court lacked jurisdiction over the
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RCRA citizen suit until the cleanup was complete. The court of appeals
found that the language in the statute was broad enough to be read as
authorizing remedial actions for both federal and non-federal land.
Therefore, the court held that the Air Force's remedial action for OU- 1 fell
under the statute's provision for remedial cleanup and was subject to the





Benzman v. Whitman, 523 F.3d 119 (2nd Cir. 2008)
This case involves the plaintiff class of residents who live, go to
school, or work in lower Manhattan or Brooklyn. The claim is against the
individual and governmental agency liability for the September 11th
aftermath. The main claim is about the air quality of the area after
September 11th. The plaintiff class argued that the government officials
misled them by saying the air quality was safe enough for people to return
home, to work and to school. The defendants in the case are Christine
Todd Whitman, former Administrator for the Environmental Protection
Agency, Stephan L. Johnson, current Administrator for the EPA, and the
EPA.
The plaintiffs have four complaints related to the defendant's
response to the allegedly dangerous air quality of lower Manhattan and
Brooklyn caused by the collapse of the World Trade Center towers on
September 11, 2001. The first count is a called the Bivens claim, which
sought damages from Whitman alleging that soon after the 9/11 incident,
Whitman and other EPA officials under her supervision failed to report
health risks of the allegedly dangerous air particles due to the dust from
the collapse of the buildings or had misrepresented the nature of those
risks. Plaintiffs allege the EPA violated the plaintiffs' substantive due
process right to be free from health risks created by the government. This
count does not accuse Whitman of purposefully intending to cause harm,
but rather she acted with deliberate indifference because she knew her
statements and the press release statements were false.
The second count of the claim known as "the APA count" alleged
that the EPA failed to meet its regulatory obligations regarding air quality
and cleanup in the affected area. This claim is under the APA against the
EPA. The APA also claimed that the EPA violated the plaintiffs' Fifth
Amendment right of due process. It also claimed a finding of liability and
injunctive relief to compel the EPA to perform tests to see whether there
were dangerous substances in the affected area and to have a professional
cleanup of the area.
The third count is a mandamus claim that seeks to compel the EPA
to perform what the plaintiffs call mandatory duties of the EPA to clean up
the dust caused by the collapse of the World Trade Center buildings.
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The fourth count is a claim brought pursuant to CERCLA
subsection 1, which alleged that the EPA violated the National
Contingency Plan ("NCP") regulations under CERCLA.
The district court denied a dismissal of the first count and held that
it clearly established a violation of substantive due process. The EPA then
sought dismissal of count two as well under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedures 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The district court agreed that the
agency decisions were discretionary because the NCP regulations were not
mandatory duties. However, the court also ruled that this did not preclude
judicial review of the entire APA count. Count three was also dismissed.
Count four was dismissed because the plaintiffs alleged a failure to
perform non-discretionary acts.
Whitman now appeals the denial to dismiss the first count. The
plaintiffs' main allegation is that Whitman should have been held
personally liable for the damages because she was aware of the dangers
and knowingly approved of false press releases. The purpose of having a
Bivens claim is to prevent unconstitutional behavior by individual federal
officials. However, the defendants argue that no court has ever held a
government official liable for damages by approving press releases or
making public statements. This is a new claim all together. The Second
Circuit now examines the situation to see if there are any "special factors"
that would weigh against allowing a Bivens claim. The court decided that
a suit against a federal official for a federal disaster response would
constitute as a "special factor" that would weigh against a Bivens claim.
The court then said that if an implied cause of action were available, it
would have to determine if the facts showed that the governmental officer
violated a constitutional right. In order to do so the plaintiff must show
that the official's conduct was "so egregious, so outrageous, that it may
fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience." County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 n.8 (1998). In the instant case,
the court found no intent by Whitman to injure anyone. The Supreme
Court recognizes two different theories of liability under the substantive
Due Process: "special relationship" liability, and "state-created-danger"
liability. The Second Circuit found that the plaintiffs' claims did not




The court finally stated that there are not always legal remedies
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Weaver's Cove Enermy LLC v. Rhode Island. 524 F.3d 1330
(D.C. Cir. 2008)
In 2004, Weaver's Cover Energy (WCE) applied for a dredge and
fill permit from the Army Corps of Engineers to dredge parts of the
Taunton River in Massachusetts and of Mount Hope Bay in Rhode Island.
WCE intended to use the area to build a liquefied natural gas import
terminal. WCE initiated suit against the Rhode Island Department of
Environmental Management (RIDEM) and the Massachusetts Department
of Environmental Protection (MassDep) alleging that the two state
agencies failed to comply with the timeliness required by the Clean Water
Act (CWA), and had thereby waived their right to review WCE's
application for a dredge and fill permit. The D.C. Circuit panel affirmed
dismissal of WCE's case since WCE did not have standing to sue.
Section 401(a)(1) of the CWA prohibits states that participate in
the environmental regulatory process from "fail[ing] or refus[ing] to act on
a request for certification, within a reasonable period of time (which shall
not exceed one year) after receipt of such request, the certification
requirements . . . shall be waived with respect to such Federal
application." WCE submitted its application pursuant to the CWA to
RIDEM and MassDep in early 2004. WCE waited two years without a
decision as to the application's completeness from MassDep before
amending its application to MassDep's satisfaction in December of 2006.
RIDEM, which had already informed WCE to submit additional
information, received continuing supplements from WCE until May of
2007. MassDep notified WCE that it would stay WCE's application
pending the Coast Guard's determination regarding the application in June
of 2007. That same month, RIDEM stated its review would continue.
WCE then filed an action alleging that RIDEM and MassDep had failed
the requirements of the Clean Water Act by failing to act definitively in a
reasonable amount of time. WCE argued that by failing to act in a timely
manner, the two state regulators had waived their part in the permitting
process.
To seek judicial relief, WCE needed to show an injury to a legally
cognizable interest, that the conduct of the defendant caused the injury,
and that the judiciary could provide a remedy for WCE's injury. WCE's
strongest argument for injury was that the delay caused by the two state
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agencies injured a legal interest, made cognizable by Section 401(a)(1) of
the CWA. Assuming arguendo that such an injury could satisfy the first
requirement of standing, the Court reasoned that the court was powerless
to redress that injury, because the state agencies would still be able to
provide their recommendations to the Corps, which held the ultimate
responsibility for the federal permit. Notably, the Corps is not limited by
the same one year restriction that the states are. This means that the Court
could issue a mandate that the state agencies waived their right to provide
certification requirements, but as long as they recommend certification
requirements to the Corps before the Corps issues or denies a permit, the
Corps will still be free to consider the state's recommendations and the
Corps is not limited by an explicit timeframe. WCE argues that leaving
the Corps free to accept untimely submittals from the states renders
Section 401(a)(1) inoperative. However, the court reasons that the Corps
had the discretion to hear from state regulators if it wanted to, and could
do so whenever it decided.
BRETT MALAND
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